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L Introduction
A critical issue in the trial of many product liability actions is whether a jury will
hear evidence of other accidents' involving the same or a similar product. Many
arguments have been advanced as to why this evidence is relevant and admissible,
and as many arguments have been advanced why this evidence is not relevant and
should not be admitted. In every product liability case where "other accident"
* B.A. 1965, Williams College; J.D. 1968, University of Virginia. Member of the firm of Monte,
Marriott & Sachs, Sea Girt, New Jersey. The author thanks Professor Ronald L. Carlson for reviewing
the manuscript and providing helpful comments.
1. Unless otherwise stated, the term "accident," as used in this article, is intended to refer to a
discreet event causing immediate injury or damage, and to exclude exposure to chemicals or other
substances over time. In long-term exposure cases, epidemiological studies, or other considerations
beyond the scope of this article may apply.
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evidence arises, the ruling of the court on this issue has the potential to affect
significantly the outcome of the case Courts in various jurisdictions, however,
have reached different results. The purpose of this article is to consider whether
other accident evidence should be admissible in a product liability action and, if so,
under what circumstances it should be admissible.
Arguments advanced - and sometimes accepted by courts - as to why evidence
of other accidents should be admissible in a product liability action include claims
that such evidence is needed for the following purposes: (1) to prove the existence
of a condition or defect; (2) to prove causation; (3) to show the extent of the risk
created; (4) to show the manufacturer's notice or knowledge of the dangers of the
product; (5) to show the manufacturer's knowledge of the foreseeability of the use
to which the product was put at the time of the accident in question; (6) to serve as
a basis for the testimony of plaintiffs expert; (7) to affect the credibility of a
defense expert; and (8) to form the basis of a claim for punitive damages.3 Before
evaluating the validity of these arguments, however, it is important to consider
certain evidentiary foundational requirements.
I. Evidentiary Foundational Requirements
A. Relevance
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402 (and similar state rules), "[e]vidence which
is not relevant is not admissible."4 "Relevant evidence" is defined as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence."5
If there is no dispute as to a particular issue or fact, "other accident" evidence
presented as proof of that issue or fact iA not relevant because it does not make the
existence of the issue or fact either "more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence." If the evidence is not relevant, it should not be
admissible. In Rye v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.,6 for instance, the
2. The authors of an article suggesting the manner in which attorneys should argue for the
admissibility of "other accident" evidence speak of the "potentially pivotal probative value of such
evidence." Francis H. Ham, Jr. & Mitchell K. Shelly, The Admissibility of Other Similar Incident
Evidence: A Three Step Approach, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 541, 542 (1992). Elsewhere, another author
mentions "the impact previous incident evidence may haye on ajury" and asserts that "evidence of other
accidents involving the same product can be highly beneficial to its proponent." Anthony Frazier, Note,
The Admissibility of Similar Incidents in Product Liability Actions, 53 Mo. L. REv. 547, 547-48 (1988).
McCormick on Evidence refers to "the prejudice that such evidence can carry with it" and points out that
as a result, most judges uill scrutinize this evidence carefully. I JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 200 (4th ed. 1992).
3. For categories I through 4, see 1 STRONG, supra note 2, § 200, and cases cited infra Parts III.A-D.
For categories 5 through 8, see cases cited infra Parts III.E-H. See also 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EvIDENCE 401[10], at 401-65 to -70 (1995).
4. FED. R. EvD. 402
5. FED. R. EVID. 401




plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of other accidents to show, among other
things, that Black & Decker should have been on notice that its circular saws could
bind in the wood and kick back. The defendant admitted awareness of this potential,
however. Because this was not a controverted issue, the court found that "appellant
was not harmed by the [trial] court's refusal to allow in the prior incidents as
evidence that appellee had notice that its saws could kick back."7
Proof of other accidents is, at most, circumstantial evidence of the proposition
which is sought to be proven. "Direct evidence" has been defined as "evidence
which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue," and "circumstantial evidence" has
been defined as evidence where, "even if the circumstances depicted are accepted
as true, additional reasoning is required to reach the proposition to which it is
directed."' McCormick on Evidence notes that "circumstantial evidence.., can be
offered to help prove a material fact, yet be so unrevealing as to be irrelevant to that
fact."' In many instances, the dissimilar nature of "other claims" or "other
accidents" places such evidence in the "unrevealing" category. As one court has
pointed out, "As the circumstances and conditions of the other accidents become
less similar to the accident under consideration, the probative force of such evidence
decreases."10
Another concern which militates against the relevance of "other accident"
evidence is the occasional lack of a factual basis for such evidence. Assuming that
a plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence that other claims have been made of the same
type of accident, that evidence is not necessarily proof that the accidents, in fact,
occurred as alleged. For example, it is difficult to conceive of a more common
claim than one made by a driver whose vehicle strikes another vehicle in the rear
that "my brakes failed." Even if someone were to compile police reports throughout
the country involving particular models of automobiles, or to produce transcripts of
testimony under oath from the drivers in municipal court, this would not be
probative of either a design or manufacturing defect in the vehicles." Permitting
evidence that other claims of accidents have occurred, however, implies - without
proof - that these claims have a basis in truth.
7. Id. at 103.
8. 1 STRONG, supra note 2, § 185.
9. Id.
10. Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1988). See also infra Part
II.C.
11. Similarly, this author has found that in litigation relating to chain saw injuries, an overwhelming
percentage of the claims have involved an allegation that there was a rotational kickback of the chain
saw and that if only one or another device to reduce or eliminate the risk of harm from rotational
kickback had been present, the accident or injury would not have occurred. (Rotational kickback is
defined as "the rapid upward and backward motion of the saw that can occur when the moving saw
chain near the upper portion of the tip of the guide bar contacts an object such as a log or branch."
AMERICAN NAr'L STANDARDS INST. standard ANSI B 175.1-1991, Gasoline-Powered Chain Saws - Safety
Requirements, § 3.16.2 (1991).) These claims and sworn testimony in support of them, however, involve
a number of instances where the facts of the particular accident make rotational kickback physically
impossible. One requirement for rotational kickback is tip contact. Nevertheless, some plaintiffs have
insisted that rotational kickback occurred, even while also insisting that there was no tip contact.
1996]
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Allowing a jury to hear evidence that other accidents occurred in a certain
manner when they did not occur in that manner would be highly misleading. In
Yellow Bayou Plantation, Inc. v. Shell Chemical, Inc."2 (a claim against the
manufacturer and distributor of an herbicide which allegedly failed to control
various pest-grasses in plaintiffs field), for instance, plaintiff attempted to use a list
of lawsuits and complaints to Shell about the herbicide as proof that Shell knew of
the ineffectiveness of the herbicide. As the court stated, "[t]he most that these items
could have indicated was that absent third parties had made this claim to or against
Shell from time to time. To exclude evidence of such faint probative value and high
potential for unfair prejudice was well within the trial court's discretion."'3
B. Hearsay
"Hearsay" is defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 801 as "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Established hearsay principles
render inadmissible various categories of evidence viewed as emanating from
untrustworthy sources. These principles have a direct impact upon the admissibility
of "other accident" evidence.
When a plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence of other accidents, rarely is there an
attempt "to produce testimony from individuals with personal knowledge of the
accidents sought to be admitted. Pleadings and documents from other cases,
however, when offered as proof of other accidents, clearly constitute hearsay. They
also frequently originate from a biased source, such as a plaintiff seeking damages
or that plaintiffs attorney. Similarly, records of claims provided by a defendant
during discovery and offered into evidence by the plaintiff also constitute hearsay
and often arise from the same biased sources.
The fact that an injured person is making a claim against a manufacturer and has
a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation raises serious questions of the
reliability of the information provided by that person. These questions of reliability
intensify when accidents are not witnessed by anyone except the person making the
claim. However, it is frequently information provided by other litigants or claimants
from unwitnessed accidents that forms the basis of the "other accident" evidence
sought to be admitted in the pending litigation. 4
Many courts have recognized that serious problems of reliability exist as to
information furnished by those with a stake in the outcome of a claim. In
McKinnon v. Skil Corp., for instance, the court held that "other accident" evidence
from Consumer Product Safety Commission reports was properly excluded by the
trial judge as untrustworthy hearsay, in part because "[m]ost of the data contained
12. 491 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1974).
13. Id. at 1243.
14. Even where another accident has been witnessed by someone other than the injured party, the
witness is often a friend or coworker of the injured party, and not an unbiased observer. See infra note
70 and accompanying text.




in the reports is simply a paraphrasing of versions of the accidents given by the
victims themselves who surely cannot be regarded as disinterested observers."'" In
Soden v. Freightliner Corp.,7 reference was made to the fact that "complaints are
unsworn hearsay allegations of persons seeking to recover money damages from the
defendant.""5 In Cramer v. Kuhns,9 the court stated that owner surveys mentioned
in a study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) "are
rank hearsay" and inadmissible."6 In Faries v. Atlas Truck Body Manufacturing
Co.,21 it was held to be error to allow an investigating patrolman to express the
opinion that a motorcyclist drove at an excessive speed when he lost control of his
motorcycle, where the opinion was based in part on statements of the driver of the
second vehicle involved in the collision.' And in In re "Agent Orange" Product
Liability Litigation,' the court rejected expert opinion testimony as to the cause
of the medical condition of "Agent Orange" claimants based in part on specific
anecdotal written information supplied by the plaintiffs.' As Chief Judge
Weinstein stated in his opinion, "the court takes judicial notice - based on hun-
dreds of trials - that no reputable physician relies on hearsay checklists by
litigants to reach a conclusion with respect to the cause of their afflictions. '
In Wolf v. Procter & Gamble Co.,26 it was alleged that plaintiff Stacy Wolf
contracted toxic shock syndrome (TSS) as a result of the use of Rely tampons
manufactured and distributed by the defendants. Plaintiffs claimed that evidence of
16. Id. at 278. The dissenting opinion in Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 851 P.2d 1084 (Or. 1993),
rev'd, 512 U.S. 415 (1994), points out that information received from the CPSC, obtained from hospitals,
is "double hearsay," or "hearsay within hearsay," since "some person told a care-giver about the accident,
and the care-giver reported to CPSC." Oberg, 851 P.2d at 1103 n.2 (Peterson, J., dissenting). There is
a further discussion of the CPSC procedure infra note 181. See also Kontz v. K-Mart Corp., 712 F.2d
1302, 1304 (8th Cir. 1983) (involving a collapse of a folding vinyl lounge chair, where the court upheld
the discretion of the trial judge in excluding the results of a Consumer Product Safety Commission study
purportedly revealing approximately 8000 injuries per year from folding or beach chairs, "especially in
the absence of proof of similarity of circumstances").
17. 714 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1983) (claim against truck manufacturer for post-collision fuel fire).
18. Id. at 507 n.12.
19. 650 N.Y.S.2d 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), motion for leave to appeal dismissed without opinion,
662 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1995) (claim against motorcycle manufacturer and driver alleging, in part, a design
defect in the motorcycle side stand).
20. Id. at 131 (holding admission of the NHTSA study to be re'ersible error due to the hearsay it
contained and for other reasons, including the lack of information which would permit a showing of
substantial similarity between the subject accident and the ones mentioned in the study).
21. 797 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1986) (product liability action by a motorcyclist against the
manufacturers of his motorcycle and of the truck with which he collided).
22. Id. at 623-24; see also Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Stegall, 659 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1981)
(a non-product liability motor vehicle accident case). In Stegall, one of the plaintiffs claims, that a
trooper's opinion of the point of impact between two vehicles should be admissible as expert testimony
under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, was rejected because the opinion "was derived
primarily from the story of a biased eyewitness," an employee of the plaintiff. Stegall, 659 F.2d at 722.
23. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
24. Id. at 1243-47.
25. Id. at 1246.
26. 555 F. Supp. 613 (D.N.L 1982).
1996]
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other injuries and deaths from TSS of users of Rely was relevant as to the issue of
the unreasonableness of the danger of this product and also as to the issue of
proximate cause. Defendants moved, in limine, to exclude evidence of occurrences
of TSS other than that to plaintiff Stacy Wolf, and plaintiffs opposed this motion.
In granting the motion, the court stated as follows:
The evidence of consumer complaints consists of complaints made
over the telephone and incorporated into a written record by employees
of Procter & Gamble and complaints contained in letters to the
company. Even if the records made by Procter & Gamble employees
are admissible as records of a regularly conducted activity pursuant to
Fed.R.Evid. 806(6),['] the hearsay statements that they contain must
also be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Fed.R.Evid.
805. However, neither these statements nor the statements in the letters
of complaint ate admissible under any of the hearsay rule exceptions.'
C. Requirement of Similarity
The rule generally followed is that a party seeking to introduce evidence of other
accidents must show that the other accidents are substantially similar to the accident
at issue. It has been stated that the extent of similarity which is needed generally
depends upon what the other accidents are designed to prove.' If the evidence is
intended to show dangerousness, "a high degree of similarity will be essential,"3'
and if intended to show notice, "a lack of exact similarity of conditions will not
cause exclusion provided the accident was of a kind which should have served to
warn the defendant. "3 Similarity is closely related to relevance, since unless
another accident is similar to the one in question, it cannot be relevant to it.32 The
issue of what constitutes similarity, however, involves two questions. First, is the
same or a substantially similar product involved? And second, is there a similarity
of circumstances of the accident?
If different products, or even different models of the same product, are involved
in other accidents, those other accidents may have little or no relevance to the claim
in issue, even if the other models are produced by the same manufacturer. Different
models frequently have different characteristics, and these differences may affect the
occurrence or causation of an accident. For example, a different model of a
27. Presumably, the court meant Rule 803(6), the business record exception to the hearsay rule.
28. Wolf, 555 F. Supp. at 620.
29. 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 3, 401[10], at 401-67 to -68.
30. Id. 1401[10l, at 401-67.
31. Id. 401[10], at 401-68; see also Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Products Liability:
Admissibility of Evidence of Other Accidents to Prove Hazardous Nature of Product, 42 A.L.R.3D 780
(1972 & Supp. 1995). See discussion infra Part III.D.
32. Weinstein and Berger state that "when dealing with evidence of similar accidents or incidents,
the greater the degree of similarity and proximity between the similar accident and the accident at bar,
the greater the probative value of the evidence." I WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 3, 401 (10], at




pneumatic nailer (sometimes called a "nail gun") may have a different size trigger,
different balance, or other different parts which could affect an inadvertent discharge
of a nail.3 Likewise, different models of any product (or later variations of the
same model) may contain different on-product warnings; a later version may have
the warnings affixed in a more permanent manner; or there may be different
warnings contained in the manuals. These differences also can affect the likelihood
of an accident occurring.' Moreover, a comparison of other claims may reveal that
experts in those matters made criticisms of designs or warnings which were changed
before the accident in the later claim. In such circumstances, if any merit existed
in the criticisms in the prior matters, the fact that a change has occurred seriously
compromises any allegation that the prior claims are similar and should be admitted
into evidence.
In Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc.,35 plaintiffs head bumped into the nose of a
pneumatic nailer which was being used by a coworker, causing the discharge of a
nail and resultant brain injuries. The design of the nailer was such that two devices
had to be engaged in order for a nail to be discharged; a work contact element at
the nose of the nailer called a "contact trip" had to be pressed against a surface, and
the trigger had to be depressed.' Plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of other
accidents and was largely permitted to do so by the trial judge, who also permitted
cross-examination of the defense expert regarding other claims about which there
was insufficient proof of similarity. The Eighth Circuit reversed plaintiffs verdict,
pointing out that the defense expert was "testifying as to his opinions, and any
qualified expert must be entitled to do that without having to rebut extraneous
33. See discussion infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
34. Differences in warnings can be particularly critical in those jurisdictions which recognize a
"heeding presumption." In New Jersey, for instance, the courts have held that a plaintiff is entitled to
a rebuttable presumption that if an adequate warning had been given, it would have been read and
heeded. Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710,720 (N.J. 1993) (asbestos case); Theer v. Philip Carey
Co., 628 A.2d 724, 729 (N.J. 1993) (asbestos case). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402(A) cmt. j (1965), and the following product liability cases (among others) where the heeding
presumption has been recognized: Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 716 (5th
Cir. 1986) (involving a safety suit being worn at the time of a fire) (Texas law); Ferebee v. Chevron
Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (herbicide) (Maryland law); Payne v. Soft Sheen
Prods., 486 A.2d 712, 725 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985) (permanent wave solution); Dias v. Daisy-Heddon, 390
N.E.2d 222,225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (BB gun); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1057
(Kan. 1984) (oral contraceptive); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978)
(motor vehicle); Butz v. Werner, 438 NAV.2d 509, 517 (N.D. 1989) (inner tube with harness designed
to be pulled with tow rope behind a boat); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1382
(Okla. 1974) (oral polio vaccine); Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 721 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. 1986) (can
punch machine); House v. Armour of America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (bullet-
resistant vest), affd, No. 950088, 1996 Utah LEXIS 108 (Utah Dec. 13, 1996). If one accident involves
a product with more adequate warnings (either on-product or in the manual) than those for a product
involved in a prior accident, application of the "heeding presumption" would seem to support a
contention that this dissimilarity in warnings would make the subsequent accident less likely to occur.
35. 997 F.2d 496 (8th Cir. 1993).
36. Id. at 498.
1996]
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evidence of dissimilar accidents."37 The court also stated that for other accident
evidence to be admissible, the proponent of that evidence "must show that the facts
and circumstances of the other incident are substantially similar to the case at
bar."3 In reversing plaintiffs verdict, the court held that the trial judge had abused
his discretion by permitting questioning of the defense expert about other
accidents.39
The court in Drabik also pointed out that plaintiffs experts alleged that several
factors contributed to the conclusion that the nailer in question was unreasonably
dangerous, including that "the weight, balance, and design characteristics of the
nailer encourage the user to hold and carry the tool with the trigger depressed, thus
elevating the danger of discharge through accidental contact."' In finding that the
plaintiff had not produced any competent evidence to show whether some of the
other accidents were "substantially similar," the court pointed out that "[m]any of
these instances involved different model contact trip nailers than the N16CT" (the
model involved in the case).41
In Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,42 the court excluded evidence of accidents
of structural failure of various aircraft models manufactured by the defendant, noting
that there were diff.-rent models involved and that "[e]vidence of accidents in the
first model would rot have been sufficiently material to the cause of accidents in
the fifth model to justify its admission." '43 And in Uitts v. General Motors Corp.,"
the court held that further discovery regarding a recall campaign for General Motors
engine mounts on Chevrolet Blazer trucks did not have to be provided because the
model involved in plaintiffs accident contained four engine mounts and was not
subject to the recall campaign, which involved certain Chevrolet Blazers with three
engine mounts."5
In Trejo v. Keller Industries" and Barker v. Deere & Co.,47 some of the
testimony of other accidents sought to be adduced involved both dissimilar products
and dissimilar circumstances of the accidents. In Trejo, plaintiff was thrown to the
ground and sustained injuries when the upper portion of an extension ladder slid
down into the base section. He attempted to present evidence of other such
occurrences, but the trial court sustained an objection to this proposed evidence. In
affirming, the appellate court pointed out that some of the other cases involved
ladders with a double rung lock mechanism as opposed to the single lock on the
37. Id. at 509.
38. Id. at 508
39. Id. at 509.
40. Id. at 502.
41. Id. at 504.
42. 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958).
43. Id. at 608.
44. 62 F.R.D. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
45. Id. at 562. Unlike the other cases cited, Uitts involved discovery of other accidents. Courts
generally - and properly - permit greater latitude in allowing discovery of other accidents than they
do in permitting these accidents to be introduced into evidence before the jury.
46. 829 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).




accident ladder, that one case involved a ladder with different side rails, and that
none of the other cases involved an accident which had occurred in the precise
manner in which plaintiff's accident occurred. 8
Barker involved a rather unusual accident and the introduction at trial, through
plaintiffs expert, of other accident evidence involving dissimilar products and
dissimilar accidents. In Barker, plaintiff was dragging a log hooked to his tractor
with a fifteen-foot-long chain. At one point in this process, the front end of the log
became stuck in the ground, causing the rear end of the log to flip over in a pole-
vault-type fashion, strike the plaintiff, eject him from his seat, and throw him to the
ground, where he was run over by the tractor. Plaintiffs expert claimed there should
have been an operator protective system (OPS) for the tractor and, in an attempt to
show a defect, testified to accident statistics involving deaths and injuries from
tractor accidents in general, rollover accidents, and fatalities occurring as a result
of the operator being ejected from his seat and run over or being struck by a falling
object4
In reversing plaintiffs verdict, the court in Barker held that there was insufficient
evidence from which the trial court could find that the prior accidents "were in any
way similar to the case before us."5 The court continued that the record contained
only "raw numbers and statistical extrapolations," "did not contain any specific
information with regard to the details of any single accident," and concerned tractors
generally, not specifically tractors of the defendant and not the model in question."
Even where a similar product is involved, differences in the circumstances of the
accidents may make "other accident" evidence irrelevant. 2 As the court stated in
Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc.,' "[tihe general rule of limiting the admission of
other accident evidence to those events which were substantially similar ensures that
the focus of the trial stays on the specific type of accident forming the basis of the
case."
'4
48. Trejo, 829 S.W.2d at 596-97.
49. Barker, 60 F.3d at 161-62.
50. Id. at 163.
51. Id.
52. For instance, in a case such as Trejo v. Keller Industries, 829 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992),
involving a telescoping top (fly) section of an extension ladder, it would be unfairly prejudicial and
irrelevant to permit evidence of prior injuries from a ladder tipping over, even if one were to allege
"similarity" because both accidents involve "ladder stability of the section on which the plaintiff was
standing." Similarly, in a pneumatic nailer claim in which a worker discharged an unwanted second nail
in a rapid "double-firing" while in the process of nailing, causing a ricochet and consequent eye injury,
it would be unreasonable and unfairly prejudicial to permit evidence of accidents such as in Drabik v.
Stanley-Bostitch. Inc., 997 F.2d 496 (8th Cir. 1993), where a worker was not in the process of nailing
but was carrying the nailer with the trigger depressed and made direct contact with a coworker. Although
one could allege that both nailer accidents were similar because they involved "inadvertent actuation,"
it is also obvious that an accident definition can be so broad as to be all-encompassing, and thus
meaningless.
53. 997 F.2d 496 (8th Cir. 1993).
54. Id. at 509.
19961
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The decision in General Motors Corp. v. Moseley"5 illustrates what can happen
when evidence of other accidents comes into a case without proof of substantial
similarity. Moseley involved the death of a driver of a 1985 GMC pickup truck
which was struck on the driver's side by another pickup truck. The side saddle fuel
tank on the truck of plaintiffs' decedent ruptured, bursting into flames and burning
the decedent. Even though plaintiffs' counsel presented no evidence of similar
incidents, he repeatedly referred to 120 law suits (and occasionally to an estimated
240 deaths) from other accidents and made further references to these other
accidents despite a ruling in favor of General Motors on this issue on a motion in
limine. The jury returned a verdict of $4,241,611.84 for compensatory damages and
assessed $101,000,000 against the defendant in punitive damages. This verdict was
reversed, however, as a result of the unfair prejudice sustained by the defendant. As
the court stated, "[w]ithout a showing of substantial similarity, the evidence is
irrelevant as a matter of law .... "'
The court in Moseley also pointed out that the issue it was considering was
neither relevance nor the permissible use of "other accident" evidence, but instead,
"the foundational requirements for admission of that type of evidence.""7 It is, of
course, critical to make the distinction between whether evidence of prior accidents
is admissible and whether a party has satisfied the foundational requirements for
admission. The fact that a jurisdiction may permit evidence of other accidents for
certain purposes does not mean that the "other accident" evidence is admissible
without sufficient proof of similarity and satisfaction of the other foundational
requirements for admission.
D. Unfair Prejudice, Confusion of Issues, Misleading the Jury, Undue Delay,
Waste of Time, or Cumulative Evidence
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, even evidence that is relevant "may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'"
"Unfair prejudice" in this rule means "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."59
The potential for unfair prejudice from the introduction of "other accident"
evidence is clear from General Motors Corp. v. Moseley,' where the jury awarded
$101,000,000 in punitive damages, and Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc.,61 where
55. 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
56. Id. at 306 (quoting Carlton Co. v. Poss, 183 S.E.2d 231, 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971)).
57. Id. at 307.
58. FED. R. EvID. 403.
59. FFD. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note. As one court correctly pointed out, however,
"'unfair prejudice' as used in Rule 403 is not to be equated with testimony simply adverse to the
opposing party. Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material. The prejudice must be 'unfair."'
Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1980).
60. 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).




the jury awarded $7,500,000 in punitive damages. Both of these verdicts were set
aside based upon the unfair prejudice created by "other accident" evidence, and the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Drabik held that the defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the punitive damages issue. As the court pointed
out in Drabik, "evidence of other injuries may also raise extraneous controversial
points, lead to a confusion of issues, and present undue prejudice disproportionate
to its usefulness."'62 A similar position had previously been taken by the court in
McKinnon v. Skil Corp.,' which stated that:
Even when substantial identity of the circumstances is proven, the
admissibility of such evidence [of prior accidents] lies within the
discretion of the trial judge who must weigh the dangers of unfairness,
confusion, and undue expenditure of time in the trial of collateral issues
against the factors favoring admissibility.'
In Brooks v. Chrysler Corp.,' the trial court refused to permit evidence of other
consumer complaints and responses to questionnaires in a claim by plaintiffs for
injuries and death resulting from alleged brake piston seizure. In affirming under
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court of appeals pointed to the
minimal probative value of the proposed evidence and the delay which would result,
stating that "Chrysler would have attempted to rebut the substance of each of the
330 complaints or to distinguish the nature of the complaints contained therein from
the alleged defect in this case."' And in Post v. Manitowoc Engineering Corp.,67
a case involving collapse of a crane manufactured by the defendant, the court
unanimously agreed with the refusal of the trial judge to allow the plaintiffs to
introduce evidence relating to a prior collapse of one of defendant's cranes.' As
the court stated, "[t]his would have simply raised collateral issues in an already very
complicated case. '
Since mere allegations of claims and lawsuits constitute hearsay, a party seeking
to introduce competent proof of other accidents ought to be required to produce
testimony of witnesses with personal knowledge of these other accidents. This
requirement would normally be fulfilled by producing live witnesses or de bene esse
deposition testimony where witnesses are subject to cross-examination by the
defendant." Live testimony and the reading of prior testimony from an earlier case
62. Id. at 508.
63. 638 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 277; accord Rye v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co. 889 F.2d 100, 103 (6th Cir. 1989).
65. 786 F.2d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
66. Id. at 1198.
67. 211 A.2d 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965).
68. Id. at 391.
69. Il
70. While it might be argued that deposition or trial testimony from claims by other plaintiffs
against the same defendant should be permitted, such an argument ignores the fact that the defendant's
motive in taking the depositions or questioning the witnesses in the other matters may well have been
different from what the motive would be if the witnesses were to testify live in the present matter to
prove similarity of the accidents. For instance, a defendant may wish at a- deposition, or during a
19961
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were, in fact, utilized by the plaintiff in Drabik as proof of the other accidents, in
addition to the cross-examination of the defense expert about other accidents which
was held to have been improper."
An issue which the trialjudge will have to address, however, is whether one case-
plaintiffs claim in the case before the court- is to be tried, or whether there are to be
a number of mini-trials regarding the facts of each of the other accidents sought to be
proven." If there is a dispute as to whether earlier accidents or products are
"similar," the defendant should certainly have the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses as to the earlier accidents and produce other evidence, if desired, to
controvert the claims of similarity.73 The risk of confusion, waste of time, and
undue prejudice is evident, however, if these mini-trials are to occur.7 4
plaintiffs testimony at trial, not to dispute the plaintiffs version of an accident, feeling content that other
testimony or evidence at trial will make clear that the accident did not occur as plaintiff claims. The
defendant also may not contest a plaintiffs version of the accident which is suspicious because in the
particular case, that ver;ion is favorable to the defendant. If the purpose of the "other accident"
testimony, however, is to show similarity to a later claim, the defendant would be expected to address
this issue directly and frame the questioning differently. If a court at a later trial permits the prior
testimony as proof that the oiher accident in fact occurred in the manner to which testified, the court
would be ignoring this difference in motive. Under FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) and related state rules, prior
testimony is not evidentiad unless the party against whom it is offered has the same motive as the party
against whom it was previously offered. Accordingly, unless it is clear that there was the same motive,
live or de bene esse testimony from the witness should be required in the instant matter if proof of
similarity is needed. Of course, if the defendant admits the manner in which another accident occurred,
testimony on this issue would be unneeded.
71. Drabik v. Stanly-Bostitch, Inc., 997 F.2d 496, 508 (8th Cir. 1993). In Drabik, the prior
testimony which was read into the record from an earlier case was admitted over the objection of the
defendant, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the admission of this testimony into evidence.
Id. There is nothing in the published opinion to indicate whether an issue was raised as to the similarity
of defendant's motive between the prior questioning of this witness in his own case and the facts for
which his testimony was produced in Drabik.
72. In DePue v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 812 F. Supp. 750, 751 (W.D. Mich. 1992), for instance,
plaintiff sought to introduce evidence about 10 other allegedly similar accidents involving the same bolt
action shotgun. The defendant disputed the cause of the other accidents, as well as the cause of plaintiffs
accident. DePue, 812 F. Supp. at 751. In granting defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of
the other accidents, the court stated that
allowing plaintiff to attempt to prove that the other incidents are substantially similar to
the accident at issue here during the course of this trial would result in ten not-so-mini-
but-actually-large sub-trials. Under FRE 403, 1 find that the likelihood of jury confusion,
along with the undue expenditure of time on these other issues, substantially outweigh any
probative value to be gained from this evidence.
Id. at 753-54. See also supra text accompanying note 54.
73. See, e.g., Becket v. American Airlines, 200 F. Supp. 243, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (stating that the
defendants charged with prior alleged malfunctions of the same model of altimeter "must have full
opportunity to explore the reasons" for the alleged malfunctions).
74. A good example of the problem which can arise, even with only one other accident, is discussed
in Wilson v. Bicycle South, Inc., 915 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1990), where plaintiff sought to introduce
evidence of an allegedly similar collapse of another wheel manufactured and assembled by two of the
defendants. As the court stated: "The cause of the alleged similar incident had never been established
because that case settled out of court. The parties in the instant case vigorously dispute the actual cause,




At trial in Uitts v. General Motors Corp.," plaintiff sought to introduce into
evidence, among other things, thirty-five reports of allegedly similar accidents. The
court stated that "[p]roof of prior accidents or occurrences are [sic] not easily
admitted into evidence, since they [sic] can often result in unfair prejudice,
consumption of time and distraction of the jury to collateral matters."76 The court
continued that to minimize the prejudicial effect of the reports, the defendant
would have had to go through each one individually with the jury. The
result would have been a mini-trial on each of the thirty-five reports
offered by plaintiffs. This would lengthen the trial considerably and the
minds of the jurors would be diverted from the claim of the plaintiffs
to the claims contained in these reports.'
The court in Uitts also pointed out that permitting reports containing hearsay into
evidence "would be tantamount to allowing the persons making the statements to
testify against defendant without being subject to cross examination or required to
take an oath. Therefore, any probative value these reports might have is outweighed
by their prejudicial nature."" In John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,"
reports relating to thirty other accidents were excluded in part because the probative
value of the proffered evidence was outweighed by the probability of delay and
waste of time." In Wolf v. Procter & Gamble Co., ' the court pointed out that
"[a] detailed analysis would have to be made of each complaint in order to
determine whether the facts were similar enough to ... [plaintiffs] complaint to
constitute notice to defendants of the particular problem with... [the product
involved] that is the subject of this litigation. '
When proof of other accidents is admitted, some courts have limited the amount
of testimony on the grounds that, at a certain point, the evidence becomes
cumulative. In Wheeler v. John Deere Co.,83 for example, plaintiff sought to
introduce live testimony of ten individuals who had been injured while cleaning
unloading augers on a particular series of combine manufactured by the defendant.
The trial court limited this testimony to five of the witnesses, finding that testimony
from the other five would be cumulative.' This portion of the trial court's holding
was affirmed,' although plaintiffs verdict was reversed due to the improper use
of "other accident" evidence during cross-examination of the defense expert."
this issue would have required a trial within a trial." Id. at 1510 n.10. The problem is compounded when
numerous other accidents are sought to be admitted.
75. 411 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affid, 513 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1975).
76. Id. at 1383.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1382-83.
79. 563 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1977).
80. Id. at 636.
81. 555 F. Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1982).
82. Id. at 622.
83. 862 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1988).
84. Id. at 1408.
85. Id.
86. See infra Part 1II.G. The evidence of the other accidents in Wheeler was found to have been
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III. Reasons Advanced for the Admissibility of "Other Accident" Evidence
With the above foundational requirements in mind, one can more easily evaluate
the arguments which have been advanced as to why evidence of other accidents
should be admitted. These arguments include those set forth below.
A. Proving the Existence of a Condition or Defect
Whether or not a product has a particular condition or characteristic is rarely in
dispute. A manufacturer is unlikely to dispute, for example, that a band saw is
capable of severing one's fingers, a ladder is capable of tipping over if unbalanced,
or a punch press is capable of crushing a hand which is inserted into it.' The
manufacturer can be expected to dispute, however, that the characteristic of the
product which leads to the injury, or which led to prior injuries, is a defect. The
question, therefore, is whether the court shoild permit the existence of other similar
accidents to be considered by a jury as evidence that a product defect does, in fact,
exist.' An analysis indicates that this should not be permitted, since the evidence
has no probative value on this issue89 and is highly prejudicial to the defendant.
Accidents can happen in a multitude of ways, and the mere fact that an accident
has occurred with a product does not mean that the product was defective."° In
fact, in no jurisdiction is the existence of the accident in suit evidence of a product
defect by itself,9 nor should it be.' Allowing the mere existence of a previous
admitted properly to show the existence of a defect. As argued infra in Part IIL.A, this is not a proper
purpose of such evidence.
87. See, e.g., Rye v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 889 F.2d 100, 103 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that
admission of knowledge by the manufacturer that its circular saws could kick back was sufficient to
preclude evidence of prior kickback accidents to show notice).
88. When this is allowed, "the jury is invited to infer from the presence of other accidents that a
design defect existed which contributed to the plaintiffs' injuries." Barker v. Deere & Co., 60 F.3d 158,
162-63 (3d Cir. 1995).
89. As indicated infia in Part III.C, under certain circumstances evidence of other similar accidents
may properly be admittel to show the extent of the risk in a balancing of a product's risk against its
utility. However, the issue of the existence of a risk is a different one from the issue of the existence of
a defect, and a jury instruction that other accidents can be considered as evidence of a risk has a much
different impact from on,- which tells the jury that other accidents can be considered as evidence of a
defect.
90. Dean Wade has stated that "[sitrict liability for products is clearly not that of an insurer. If it
were, a plaintiff would need only to prove that the product was a factual cause in producing his injury."
John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 828 (1973): see
also John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965). The New Jersey
Supreme Court has spoken similarly, stating that "[aln inference of defectiveness may not be drawn from
the mere fact that someone was injured," Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620, 627 (1996), and
pointing out that the requirement to prove a defect as part of a prima facie case "distinguishes strict from
absolute liability, and thus prevents the manufacturer from also becoming the insurer of a product," id.
at 627-28 (quoting O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 303 (N.J. 1983)).
91. Even in an American Law Reports annotation entitled Strict Products Liability: Product
Malfunction or Occurrence of Accident as Evidence of Defect, the author's reference to cases allegedly
supporting the proposition in the title speaks of cases with the "view that a prima facie case of
[Vol. 49:257
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol49/iss2/3
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accident to be used in the pending suit as evidence of a product defect, however,
is tantamount to saying that because the other accident occurred first, it can now be
used as evidence of a product defect, even though it could not have been so used
in a claim arising from the previous accident. Such a distinction based upon the
priority of the occurrence is an artificial and illogical one. Indeed, permitting the
mere existence of a prior accident to be used to show a defect would be ap-
proaching a standard of absolute, not strict, liability.93 As the Oregon Supreme
Court stated in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,' a case involving a sanding
machine, "[n]o one wants absolute liability where all the article has to do is to cause
injury.
95
Nevertheless, many courts have stated that other accidents, if sufficiently similar,
are admissible to prove a product defect.' A reason for this conclusion, however,
is rarely given, and the conclusion cannot be supported.
In fact, there is virtually no product with which it is impossible to be injured. A
product capable of penetrating wood, for instance, cannot be rendered incapable of
penetrating flesh and bone. The mere fact that it has done so before does not render
that product defective, nor should it be considered to provide evidence of a defect.
As the court stated in Hagans v. Oliver Machinery Co.,' a case involving a table
saw:
Unfortunately, the nature of the [construction] industry is such that
its tools, from the smallest tack hammer to the largest earth mover,
expose certain risks of harm to their users. Nevertheless, unless civiliza-
tion is to grind to a halt, these tools, including industrial table saws,
must continue to be marketed despite their inherent dangers."
defectiveness can be made by proof of the fact of a malfunction, failure, or occurrence of an accident
in conjunction with other circumstantial evidence such as a lack of an abnormal use of the product and
the lack of a reasonable secondary cause not attributable to defectiveness." Christopher H. Hall,
Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Product Malfunction or Occurrence of Accident as Evidence of
Defect, 65 A.L.R.4TH 346, § 3 (1988) (emphasis added).
92. Allowing the existence of an accident to be evidence of a defect would be taking one element
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine - the element that "the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of negligence," W. PAGE KEErON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 39, at 244 (5th ed. 1984) - and wrongly standing it on its head to suggest that the mere
fact that an accident occurred with a product means that such an accident "ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of a product defect."
93. See supra note 90.
94. 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
95. Id. at 1036. It is probably too broad a statement to suggest that no one wants this result.
96. See, e.g., Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 997 F.2d 496, 508 (8th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff struck
in head by a nail discharged by a coworker from a pneumatic nailer ("nail gun")); Cooper v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 945 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1991) (multipiece truck rim explosively separated
during servicing); Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1988) (plaintiffs arm
became tangled in unloading auger of combine); McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 277 (1st Cir.
1981) (foot injury from portable electric saw).
97. 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978).
98. Id. at 101.
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The same can be said of products from a wide variety of other industries. Even a
sharpened pencil, though nondefective, is capable of causing a serious eye injury."
Most courts have made clear that the mere happening of an accident while using
a product is insufficient to prove that the product is defective." If this is so for
the accident in question, it should be equally so for prior accidents.
B. Proving Causation
While a number of courts and commentators have used the general term
"causation" as one potential reason for admitting evidence of other accidents,""
there are actually three different issues involved. These issues are the use of
evidence of other accidents to prove: (1) that it was possible that the present
accident was caused in the manner alleged; (2) that the present accident was caused
in the same manner as the other accident was caused; or (3) that the present
accident was caused by a defect or dangerous condition. The courts rarely
distinguish these issues, however, and this lack of distinction can lead to confusion.
The first causation issue which can arise is whether or not a causal relationship
is even possible. Loutisell and Mueller mention that "[b]y foolish overstatement or
supreme confidence, a defendant may assert that an accident simply could not have
occurred in the manner which plaintiff asserts."'" If a defendant makes this
assertion, proper evidence of similar accidents would be quite relevant and should
be admissible to show that an accident could occur in the manner claimed. WoJ-
ciechowski v. Long-Airdox Division of Marmon "Group3 is a good example of
proper admission for this purpose.
In Wojciechowski, plaintiff alleged he was injured by the improper discharge of
a compressed air bhlsting device used in the extraction of coal. The defendant
claimed that the design of the device made impossible a misfiring caused by air
retention, and in order to refute this claim, the plaintiff and several co-employees
were permitted by the trial court to testify about other incidents of improper
99. Such an injury c'ccurred to a school child in Ohman v. Board of Education, 90 N.E.2d 474
(N.Y. 1949), although claim was brought against the board of education and school personnel for alleged
lack of supervision rather than against the product manufacturer.
100. See, e.g., Gates v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 458, 459 (10th Cir. 1974) (applying Oklahoma
law); Bruther v. General Elec. Co., 818 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (S.D. Ind. 1993); Brooks v. Colonial
Chevrolet-Buick, 579 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (Ala. 1991); Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 730 S.W.2d 479,
482 (Ark. 1987); Depre v. Power Climber, Inc., 635 N.E.2d 542, 544 (I11. App. Ct. 1994); Spott v. Otis
Elevator Co., 601 So. 2d 1355, 1364 (La. 1992); Virgil v. Kash N'Karry Serv. Corp., 484 A.2d 652, 657
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620, 627 (N.J. 1996); Woodin v.
J.C. Penney Co., 629 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Fulton v. Pfizer Hosp. Prods. Group, 872
S.W.2d 908, 911 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Selig v. BMW of North America, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 95, 100
(Tex. App. 1992, no writ).
101. See, e.g., McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 277 (1st Cir. 1981); Drabik v. Stanley-
Bostitch, Inc., 997 F.2d 4516, 508 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Evidence of other accidents may be relevant to...
causation."); Weeks v. Remington Arms Co., 733 F.2d 1485, 1491 (11 th Cir. 1984) ("Evidence of similar
accidents might be relevart to... causation."); 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 3, 401110].
102. 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 98 (1977). The
"supreme confidence" occasionally may be justified, however.




discharge of air from identically designed devices." The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court on this issue, pointing out that the "defendant had full opportunity to
cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses to develop any significant differences in
circumstances that it deemed relevant."'"
If a defendant does not have full opportunity to cross-examine as to the facts
surrounding the other accidents sought to be admitted, however, and if causation of
those accidents is contested, it would be improper to permit evidence of the other
accidents as proof in the case under review that a causal relationship is possible. An
example of such a lack of opportunity to cross-examine would be a situation where
a plaintiff merely attempts to introduce evidence that other claims have been made
that an accident occurred in a particular manner, which is pure hearsay.
A second causation issue arises when there is an attembt to use "other accident"
evidence to prove that the accident under review was caused in the same manner
as one or more other accidents. In Ramos v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., °
plaintiffs were injured when the mast of an oil drilling rig on which they were
working collapsed, telescoping within itself. At trial, plaintiffs sought to introduce
evidence that approximately two years earlier, another similar rig collapsed when
the pins connecting the upper third of the telescoping mast to the middle third
failed. 7 The Ramos accident occurred when the pins connecting the lower part
of the middle third of the mast to the top part of the bottom third failed.'
There were several different theories of accident causation presented by the
parties in Ramos. One theory was that there was a design defect similar to the
defect alleged for the prior accident; ° another theory was that operator error
caused a tool joint to hit the rams and exceed the weight capacity of the mast;"
0
and a third theory was that there was a different type of defect, for which another
defendant was responsible, which caused the rams either not to open or to open too
slowly."' The jury, in fact, agreed in a special verdict with the operator error
theory."' Despite the existence of evidence to support all three theories,"' 3 the
appellate court in Ramos reversed the trial court's refusal to permit evidence of the
prior accident on the issue of the cause of the Ramos accident."'
104. Id. at 1115-16.
105. Id. at 1116.
106. 615 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1980).
107. Both masts, though somewhat different and with different load capacities, had been
manufactured by the same company using the same design calculations, and the manufacturer admitted
that there was very little difference between the two designs. Id. at 336-37, 339-40.
108. Id. at 337.
109. The prior claim had gone to trial before Ramos and resulted in a verdict for plaintiffs. Id. at
337-39.
110. Id. at 338.
111. See Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1980) (opinion on petition
for rehearing).
112. Ramos, 615 F.2d at 337.
113. Ramos, 620 F.2d at 467-68.
114. The court also mentioned impeachment of the principal of one of the defendants as being
another basis for permitting the evidence of the prior accident. In response to questioning, this witness
1996]
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The opinion in Ramos raises troubling questions concerning the use of other
accidents to prove "causation." Substantial problems can arise in permitting a jury
to consider the cause of one accident (or of more than one accident) as evidence of
the cause of another. An accident or injury involving a product can be produced by
a number of different causes. These can include a manufacturing, design, or
warning defect, but alternatively (or in conjunction) can involve actions of an
employer or other third party (such as by product alteration, improper maintenance,
or failure to provide training), product misuse, carelessness, voluntary and
unreasonable exposure to a known risk, and even weather conditions. 5 Each of
these general categories has a number of subcategories."6 Frequently the causes
of both the other accident(s) and the accident under review are disputed, which can
require litigation of the cause of each accident."7
Even if one accident is proven - or admitted - to have occurred in a certain
manner, this fact does not mean that another accident occurred in the same manner,
nor does it have sufficient probative value to warrant admission on the issue of
causation."' Further, allowing a jury to consider one accident as evidence of the
causation of another accident can be extremely misleading, distract the jury from
the accident under consideration, and be unfairly prejudicial."' The major
problem, as stated by the court in Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., is that
"the jury might infer from evidence of the prior accident alone that ultra-hazardous
conditions existed ... and were the cause of the later accident without those issues
ever having been proved.'' Such an inference would be improper.
The third issue regarding the use of other accidents to show "causation" concerns
whether the other accidents can be evidence that a defect or dangerous condition
caused the accident in the case under review." The use of such evidence for this
falsely denied that the prior rig had fallen, and the trial court permitted no evidence to counter this false
statement and gave no charge to the jury to soften its effect. Ramos, 615 F.2d at 340.
115. See Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming the
trial judge's refusal to permit plaintiff to introduce evidence of another air crash with an identical airplane
involving, as did the accident in question, icing conditions). The court found "too few established
facts.., from which a ccmparison between the two accidents can be made." Id. at 1269.
116. For example, there are different types of design defects (which could affect the liability of
different parties, such as component part manufacturers), a large variety of different actions by third
persons, and a number of ways in which the actions of the plaintiff could cause an accident.
117. See supra Part Il.D.
118. There is an exception, however, as to the probative value of certain other similar incidents
which are proven to have occurred at the same time, such as multiple food poisonings to diners at a
restaurant who all consumed the same dish, or multiple injuries to horses at various locations who all
became ill after eating the same batch of tainted animal feed. These exceptions, though, involve defects
which have occurred during the manufacturing or distribution process and do not involve design or
warning defects in the items consumed.
119. Of course, if a plaintiff is permitted to present evidence of other "similar" accidents to show
that the accident under reiiew had the same cause, should not a defendant also be permitted to produce
evidence of other apparently "similar" accidents resulting from different causes?
120. 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
121. Id. at 1269 (quoting Gardner v. Southern Ry. Sys., 675 F.2d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 1982)).




purpose is actually a combination of two separate factors, that of defect and that of
causation. As previously discussed, "other accident" evidence is improper to prove
a dangerous condition or defect," and as suggested above," there are substantial
problems that arise in the use of evidence that one accident was caused in a certain
manner to prove that another accident was caused the same way. Combining two
improper purposes for "other accident" evidence does not make one proper purpose.
Accordingly, there is no justification for the introduction of such evidence as proof
of causation by a defect or dangerous condition.
Whether a particular condition of a product was involved in the cause of an
accident is, of course, quite different from a determination as to whether that
condition constitutes a defect or dangerous condition. There may be no dispute as
to the former, but invariably there will be a dispute as to whether that condition is
a defect. When there is no dispute about whether a condition of a product was
involved in the cause of an accident, proof on this issue is unnecessary."z
C. Proving the Extent of the Risk Created
Many jurisdictions incorporate a risk/utility analysis as a basis for determining
whether a product is defective in design."n One theory for the admissibility of
"other accident" evidence is that evidence of other similar accidents is relevant and
admissible in assessing the risk (or lack thereof) in a product so that the jury can
make a risk/utility analysis and consider the safety aspects of the product - the
likelihood that it will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury."
This theory, in fact, was adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in considering
the issue of "other accident" evidence in Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc." In
note 2, § 200.
123. See supra Part III.A.
124. See supra text accompanying 119.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
126. The factors in such a risk/utility analysis were suggested by Dean Wade in his influential
article, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973). These factors are:
(I) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user and to the public as a whole;
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable
seriousness of the injury; (3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need
and not be as unsafe; (4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility; (5) The user's ability
to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product; (6) The user's anticipated awareness
of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; and (7) The
feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or
carrying liability insurance. Id. at 837-38. Some of the cases utilizing a risk/utility analysis are: Barker
v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978); Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167,
1170 (Fla. 1979); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d. 248, 253 (Miss. 1993); Johansen v.
Makita USA, Inc., 607 A.2d 637, 642 (N.J. 1992); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204,
208 (N.Y. 1983); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Or. 1974); Foley v. Clark
Equip. Co., 523 A.2d 379, 382, 388 (Pa. 1987); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 848-
49 (Tex. 1979).
127. This is factor (2) in Dean Wade's analysis, supra note 126.
128. 579 A.2d 1241, 1248 (N.J. 1990). Ryan, however, involved an attempt by the defendant to
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Exum v. General Electric Co.,29 the court overturned a directed verdict for the
defendant, based in part upon the trial court's refusal to permit evidence of other
accidents to allow the jury to assess one side of the balance - the likelihood and
gravity of harm - in considering a "danger-utility" test.' In Drabik v. Stanley-
Bostitch, Inc.,' the court referred to other accidents being relevant to show "the
magnitude of the danger."'"
If, in fact, there is proper evidence presented - within the parameters indicated
below in this section and with all proper foundational requirements fulfilled'33 -
evidence of other accidents can serve a useful purpose in helping to determine the
extent of the risk of an injury of the type in question. However, there are a number
of questions to be resolved before this evidence is admitted.
The first question which arises in considering whether "other accident" evidence
should be permitted to show the "extent of the risk" is: What is the risk for which
the extent is to be determined? It surely cannot be the risk of an accident occurring.
Accidents can happen in many different ways, and permitting evidence of one type
of accident is not relevant and is surely misleading as to the risk of another type of
accident occurring." The accidents must be similar in order to assess risk.
An example of what would initially appear to be two "similar" lawnmower
accidents, each involving blade contact with the operator and a resultant amputation
injury, reveals how very different the risks can be. In Bell v. Montgomery Ward,'
for instance, plaintiff was operating a lawnmower, slipped on wet grass while going
show the small number of similar accidents from similar pools in order to convince the jury of the
minimal nature of the risk from the pool design under review.
129. 819 F.2d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
130. Id. at 1163.
131. 997 F.2d 496 (8th Cir. 1993).
132. Id. at 508. The "magnitude of the danger," of course, is merely another way of phrasing "the
extent of the risk."
133. See supra Part II.A-D. One of the foundational requirements, similarity of product, was
addressed with respect to "risk-benefit" in Deans v. Allegheny Int'l (USA), 590 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1990), where the court stated that "the raw number of rotary mower accidents nationwide does not
pertain to the risks attendant to the specific tractor model under examination." Id. at 827.
134. In Exum v. General Electric Co., 819 F.2d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1987), however, the court appeared
to ignore the misleading nature of different types of accidents being considered together on the issue of
risk. There, plaintiff was a 19-year-old employee of a fast food chain, was filtering hot grease used in
his employer's french fryer, and while he was lifting a six pound pan containing 15 pounds of grease at
350 degrees, a pressurized asthma inhaler dropped from his shirt pocket into the scalding liquid, causing
an explosion and bum injuries. Plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of 15 incidents in which young
employees were burned while filtering grease with the same model fryer, but this proffer was denied by
the district court upon thi, grounds that the one other incident which involved dropping an object into
the grease occurred after the date of plaintiffs accident and the other incidents *ere not sufficiently
similar. The other inciden-ts, according to the court of appeals, "involved slightly different and sundry
fact patterns - for example, spillages." Exum, 819 F.2d at 1162. Nevertheless, the court of appeals held
that all 15 incidents should have been admitted to show the extent of the danger, and further held that
all but the one occurring after plaintiff Exum's accident should have been admitted to show notice of the
dangerousness of the design. Id. at 1163. (The opinion is silent as to how many pounds of grease were
present initially and how many french fries it took to soak up the difference.)




down a slope, and attempted to maintain his balance by pulling back on the handle.
This caused his left foot to go under the mower deck and resulted in the loss of
portions of two toes. 3 A completely different type of accident occurred in Moe
v. MTD Products, Inc.,37 where plaintiff sustained an amputation of fingers on his
right hand when he reached into a discharge chute of a lawnmower to clear clogged
grass. To permit evidence of one of these injuries in the other claim would have no
bearing whatsoever upon the "extent of the risk" of the second accident occurring,
even though they both involve amputations sustained by an operator as a result of
blade contact accidents.
Additionally, even prior incidents where a plaintiff may have reached into the
discharge chute of a lawnmower of the same manufacturer to clear clogged grass
may have little relevance to the type of accident which occurred in Moe, although
at first the accidents may appear similar. In Moe, the lawnmower was equipped
with a blade/brake clutch (BBC) which was designed to stop the rotation of the
cutting blade within three seconds of the release of the control lever.3 The
control cable had frayed, causing a failure of the BBC.'39 Prior claims of am-
putation from insertion of the operator's hand into the discharge chute, however,
may have occurred on mowers not equipped with a BBC, 4 or if equipped with
a BBC, may have been caused by other types of failures or actions. If so, these
prior accidents would be meaningless in a lawsuit for a claim such as occurred in
Moe. Thus, even accidents which initially appear very similar may reveal risks of
a very different nature. In this event, one of the accidents should have no relevance
to an assessment of the "extent of risk" of the other accident occurring.
In addition to determining similarity of accidents and similarity of products, one
must also consider the extent of usage in order to evaluate properly the extent of the
risk of a product design or characteristic. Can the existence of five similar accidents
with the same model product, for instance, really provide any convincing
information without a consideration of the extent of usage of the model? Five
similar accidents out of one hundred uses of one hour each of the same model
machine may be quite significant as evidence of a high extent of risk. However,
five accidents out of many millions of hours of use of the model, would reveal a
very different risk, even if the accidents occurred in a similar manner. 4 Consider-
136. Id. at 508.
137. 73 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1995).
138. Id. at 181.
139. Id.
140. See generally Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 619 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.
1980) (discussing various lawnmower injury scenarios and the promulgation of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission requirements for lawnmower safety).
141. In Sturm v. Clark Equipment Co., 547 F. Supp. 144, 145 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 732 F.2d 161
(8th Cir. 1984), the court permitted defense testimony that there was no knowledge of any other similar
accident in 74,000 machine years of usage of 34,000 machines. Assuming that plaintiff had attempted
to introduce evidence of three similar accidents in Sturm as indicating the extent of the risk in a
risk/utility analysis, would that testimony really have had any probative value without knowing the extent
of usage of the product? See Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 581 (5th Cir. 1993) (refusing
to permit evidence of dissimilar incidents, indicating that the other incidents which plaintiff sought to
19961
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
ing only the number of accidents and not the extent of usage, as some courts permit,
is like attempting to evaluate a fraction by looking at only the numerator and
ignoring the denominator. The extent of risk cannot be determined in such a
manner. Accordingly, a failure to consider the extent of usage does not permit a
proper balancing of risk against utility.
D. Proving that the Defendant Knew or Should Have Known of the Dangers of
the Product
Some courts have held that proof of other accidents is admissible 'to show the
defendant's notice of a dangerous condition."" In Jackson v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co.,43 for instance, the court stated, "[f]or purposes of proving other
accidents in order to show defendants' awareness of a dangerous condition, the rule
requiring substantial similarity of those accidents to the accident at issue should be
relaxed.'"
The rule which generally is followed is that where other accidents are offered to
prove notice, a lack of exact similarity of conditions will not result in exclusion of
the evidence "provided the accident was of a kind which should have served to
warn the defendant."45 Why this should be so, however, is unclear, as indicated
by the court in General Motors Corp. v. Moseley.' In Moseley, where plain-
tiffs" '47 counsel repeatedly referred to other claims and deaths from other accidents
without presenting evidence of similarity, plaintiffs asserted that substantial
similarity did not have to be shown because the evidence of other accidents was
only being offered to show notice of a defect rather than the existence of a defect.
The court, however, held that "without a showing of substantial similarity, the
evidence is irrelevant as a matter of law"'' and stated, "[t]he plaintiffs' argument
begs the question, notice of what defect? If the relative defects are not similar, how
can one be notice of the other?'' 49 A number of other courts also have not relaxed
the requirement of "substantial similarity" for attempting to prove notice of a defect.'"
introduce amounted to "2/1000 of one percent of the approximately 3 to 5 million Escorts sold during
the 1980s").
142. See, e.g., Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1407-08 (10th Cir. 1988); Jackson v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1986).
143. 788 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1986).
144. Id. at 1083. The court in Jackson further stated that any differences in the circumstances
surrounding the accident go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence. Id.
145. 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 3, 401[10], at 401-67 to -68.
146. 447 S.E.2d 302, 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
147. Where reference, is made to "plaintiffs," this reference is to the Moseleys, the original plaintiffs
in the lawsuit.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 307.
150. See, e.g., Cooper v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 945 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1991);
Pettyjohn v. Kalamazoo Ctr. Corp., 868 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1989); General Motors Corp. v. Lupica,
379 S.E.2d 311, 314 (Va. 1989). However, other courts have relaxed the requirement. See, e.g., Four
Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434, 1440 (10th Cir. 1992); Shields v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 864 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1989); McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., 851 F.2d 774, 778 (5th




Notice of a hazard or danger, however, is not the same as notice of a defect. The
possibility that one can be injured while using a product does not make that product
defective or unreasonably dangerous."' In fact, a manufacturer will rarely contest
knowledge that there are certain risks or dangers resulting from the use of its
product. 5 ' If there is no dispute as to the existence of a hazard or danger, there
is no reason for a jury to hear about other accidents to "prove" knowledge of that
hazard or danger, and such evidence is irrelevant.
Further, under a strict liability analysis, some courts have held that there is an
assumption that a manufacturer knew the dangers and propensities of its product. 3
If the applicable law is that the defendant is assumed to know of the dangers of the
product, then there would be no need to prove such knowledge, and attempts to
prove it by "other accident" evidence would be superfluous."s Even in a jurisdic-
tion where the law does not assume the manufacturer's knowledge of the dangers
of the product, knowledge of the dangers is rarely in dispute.'55 Evidence of other
chain saw accidents, for example, is not needed to prove notice that there are
dangers from operating a chain saw. . Indeed, for this product and numerous
others, there are detailed warnings contained in owners' manuals and/or on the
product which clearly identify the manufacturer's knowledge of the dangers of its
product. If such knowledge is either presumed or admitted, then it is clear that
"other accident" proof is unnecessary to prove this knowledge.
Finally, where courts permit evidence of other accidents to be utilized on the
issue of notice of a dangerous condition, it is obvious that subsequent accidents are
not admissible for this purpose, as they are not relevant to this issue."
151. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
152. Certain types of dangers might not be known, however, particularly from prescription drugs
or certain types of chemicals. This may be due to the existing state of scientific knowledge.
153. See, e.g., Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976); Bilotta v. Kelley
Co., 346 N.W.2d 616,622 (Minn. 1984); Freund v. CellofilIm Properties, 432 A.2d 925, 930 (N.J. 1981);
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974); Little v. PPG Indus., 579 P.2d 940,
946 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978), affid, 594 P.2d 911 (Wash. 1979).
154. In Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983), the New York
Court of Appeals indicated that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to allow into evidence, on
the issue of notice, other complaints filed against the manufacturer, in part because in a strict products
liability action, "the manufacturer's knowledge, actual or constructive, is not in issue." Voss, 450 N.E.2d
at 210; see also Deans v. Allegheny Int'l (USA), Inc., 590 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (since
the proper focus in a products liability case is on the product and nature of the defect, not on the conduct
of the manufacturer, knowledge that other rotary lawnmowers had been associated with accidents "is
simply irrelevant").
155. See supra Part III.A.
156. See Rye v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 889 F.2d 100, 103-04 (6th Cir. 1989) (admission of
kickback potential of circular saw eliminated relevance of other accidents to prove notice of this
potential).
157. 1 STRONG, supra note 2, § 200 (4th ed. 1992); see also Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d
839, 846 (10th Cir. 1973).
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E. Proving that the Manufacturer Knew of the Use to Which the Product Was
Put at the Time of the Accident"
Questions of the foreseeability of use generally relate to whether a particular use
was "reasonably" foreseeable.'59 Even if there is abnormal use or misuse of a
product, a plaintiff is generally not barred from recovery as long as the abnormal
use or misuse is reasonably foreseeable."w Where there is abnormal use or misuse
which is not reasonably foreseeable, however, plaintiff normally will be barred from
recovery. Accordingly, whether a defendant should have known (i.e., should have
reasonably foreseen) the use of a product can be critical in the determination of
liability.
Though one may argue that prior knowledge through a claim or an accident is
evidence of reasonable foreseeability, this is not necessarily the case. Even if there
is proof that a bizarre accident happened once, this does not mean that the defendant
should reasonably expect that it will happen again.
Additionally, the fact that a claim is made of a particular type of accident or use
does not necessarily mean that it did occur in that manner, and it may even be that
it physically could not have occurred in that manner.16"' If an accident or use
which is alleged in a prior claim did not or could not have occurred in the manner
alleged, it would not give the defendant reason to expect a subsequent accident of
this type. For a prior accident or claim to constitute notice of the foreseeability of
use, of course, one must assume the truth of the prior event which allegedly
provides notice. Such an assumption of truth, however, is exactly what the hearsay
rule was meant to preclude.
Further, the date when the defendant became aware of another accident may
eliminate any possibility that the other accident could provide relevant notice of
foreseeability of us. for the matter under review."6 Regardless of the date of the
158. This proposition is similar to the proposition supra in Part III.D. However, it also deals with
the issue of foreseeability of use of the product.
159. See, e.g., Higgins v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167-68 (4th Cir. 1988)
(Maryland law); McMuray v. Deere & Co., 858 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1988) (Oklahoma law);
Ferguson v. F.R. Winkler GMBH & Co. KG, 79 F.3d 1221, 1224-25 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (District of
Columbia law); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 452 n.9, 458 (Cal. 1978); Talley v. City Tank
Corp., 279 S.E.2d 264, 271 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Varilek v. Mitchell Eng'g Co., 558 N.E.2d 365, 377
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 547-48 (Iowa 1980); Reilly v.
Dynamic Exploration, Inc., 571 So.2d 140, 144 (La. 1990); Byrnes v. Economic Mach. Co., 200 N.W.2d
104, 108 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So.2d 169, 174 (Miss. 1974); Beatty
v. Schramm, Inc., 458 A.2d 127, 129 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); Treadway v. Uniroyal Tire Co.,
766 P.2d 938, 940-41 (Okla. 1988), Burch v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 467 A.2d 615, 619 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983); Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279, 286-87 (Wis. 1974).
160. See, e.g., Higgins, 863 F.2d at 1167-68; Ferguson, 79 F.3d at 1224-25; Varilek, 558 N.E.2d
at 377; Hughes, 288 N.W.2d at 547-48; Ford Motor Co., 291 So.2d at 174; Treadway, 766 P.2d at 940-
41; Burch, 467 A.2d at 619.
161. The discussior supra in Part I.A regarding suspicious claims of brake failure and impossible
claims of rotational kickback are good examples.




other accident, it could not provide any notice of foreseeability of use if it is not
known to the defendant until after the accident in question.
F. Serving as a Basis for the Testimony of Plaintiffs Expert
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 and related state rules, an expert may rely
upon facts or data which are not admissible in evidence if these items are "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject."'" This provision raises several questions. First, is
information about other accidents of the "type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions" (and, if so, for what particular opinions and
what kind of information)? Second, what is the "particular field" in issue when
making this determination? And third, even if the expert can rely upon information
about other accidents in forming his opinions, can the expert relate this information
to the jury?
A determination of whether particular information is "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field" is a factual determination which should be
made by the court under Rule 104(a).' Some state courts, under applicable state
rules of evidence, also have held that this question is a factual one for the trial
judge." s The court in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation" (Paoli II)
stated that in making a determination as to reasonable reliance, the trial judge "must
conduct an independent evaluation into reasonableness" and can take into account
the particular expert's opinion that experts reasonably rely upon that type of data,
opinions of other experts as to its reliability, and other factors that the judge deems
relevant." One commentator has suggested that the court consider testimony by
the experts themselves, literature in the field, and perhaps judicial notice, and has
163. FED. R. EvID. 703. If the facts or data are otherwise admissible, then the expert, of course,
could rely upon the information for the purpose(s) for which it has been admitted. Christophersen v.
Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1118 (5th Cir. 1991) (Clark, C.J., concurring). This subsection,
therefore, only applies to an expert's use of otherwise inadmissible "other accident" evidence or use for
an inadmissible purpose of "other accident" evidence which is admissible only for another purpose.
164. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli 11), 35 F.3d 717, 748 (3d Cir. 1994). The court in
Paoli I1 reversed the prior holdings of the Third Circuit on this issue, finding that the gatekeeping role
for the trial judge mandated by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), as to
expert testimony requires that the factual determination of "reasonable reliance" be made by the court,
not the expert. Before Daubert, the Third Circuit had stated that in making a factual inquiry as to what
data experts in the field find reliable, the proper inquiry is "not what the court deems reliable, but what
experts in the relevant discipline deem it to be." DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 911 F.2d 941, 952
(3d Cir. 1990). The court in DeLuca also had stated that "if an expert avers that his testimony is based
on data experts in the field rely upon, then Rule 703's requirements are generally satisfied." Id. Daubert
and Paoli II clearly represent the preferable view. See also Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework,
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE, 103, 103-12 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1994).
165. See, e.g., McLellan v. Morrison, 434 A.2d 28, 30 (Me. 1981); Schaeffer v. General Motors
Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Mass. 1977); Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, 579 A.2d 1241, 1247 (N.J.
1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va. 1990); Smith v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 695
P.2d 600, 606-07 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
166. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
167. Id. at 748.
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stated that "to allow the experts themselves to pass upon the reasonableness of their
own practice would... be atypical and inconsistent with the judge's role under
[Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 104(a)."'
An important factor in assessing the reasonableness of an expert's reliance upon
"other accident" evidence is the purpose for which the expert is relying upon the
other accident(s). For an expert to state merely that his opinion is supported by the
existence of ten other similar accidents reveals nothing (besides the existence of the
other accidents) and is not helpful to the jury. The issue is why and how the other
accidents support th- opinion - in other words, the purpose for which the expert
is seeking to rely upon those accidents. If that purpose is contrary to the existing
law of the jurisdiction, then the reliance should be found to be unreasonable as a
matter of law. For example, in a jurisdiction which holds that the mere happening
of a prior accident with a product is not evidence that the product is defective,'6"
an expert who relies upon a prior accident as evidence of a defect should not be
permitted to rely upon it for that purpose because doing so would be contrary to
law.' Likewise, if the expert relies upon prior accidents to show the extent of the
risk in a risk/utility balancing equation but the prior accidents are not shown to be
substantially similar, the expert could not reasonably rely upon the other
accidents for this purpose. Further, if the expert attempts to rely upon other
accidents for a purpDse not in issue - such as the defendant's knowledge that an
accident could occur as it did" - such reliance would be irrelevant to the case
and therefore improper insofar as the case is concerned."
168. 1 STRONG, supra note 2, § 15 n. 11. This position has been supported in a case dealing with
expert testimony on behalf of a defendant concerning the paucity of other similar accidents. See Ryan
v. KDI Sylvan Pools, 579 A.2d 1241, 1247 (N.J. 1990).
169. See supra Part III.A.
170. In Melton v. Deere & Co., 887 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1989), the trial court was upheld in
precluding plaintiffs expert from expressing an opinion that the combine in question was unreasonably
dangerous based upon a risk/utility theory of strict liability when the applicable law of Mississippi was
held to use a consumer expectation, rather than risk/utility test. (The Mississippi Supreme Court later
disagreed with the federal court, however, and held that Mississippi does, in fact, follow a risk/utility test.
See Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1993).) See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 801
(West 1995) (permitting an expert to base his opinion upon material "whether or not admissible, that is
of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to
which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for
his opinion") (emphasis added). In Spencer v. G.A. MacDonald Constr. Co., 134 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App.
1976), an expert was he'd properly barred from basing his opinion upon safety orders in view of a
provision of the California Labor Code which prevented such orders from being evidential other than in
proceedings against employers. The California Law Revision Commission comment to section 801 of
the California Evidence Code indicates that the intent of the italicized phrase, supra, is that "an expert
may not base his opinion upon any matter that is declared by the constitutional, statutory, or decisional
law of the State to be an improper basis for an opinion." CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 cmt. (West 1995).
171. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
172. See supra Part III.D.
173. The court can resolve the issue of the purpose for which the expert seeks to utilize th  "other





Permitting an expert to rely upon otherwise inadmissible evidence in forming
opinions under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 does not give the expert carte blanche
to use evidence in an improper manner. If the courts or statutes have provided that
certain evidence cannot be used for a particular purpose, an expert cannot be
permitted to contravene that policy.
Upon what type of information might an expert reasonably rely in forming
opinions? This certainly would include particular types of hearsay, such as a
patient's contemporaneous statements to a physician given for purposes of
treatment 74 or a treating physician's reliance upon reports from a qualified
laboratory. It also may include hearsay such as authoritative treatises and published
studies of other scientists. 75 It should not include unverified accident reports,
lawsuits, or claims by other plaintiffs, potential plaintiffs, or other biased observ-
ers,176 nor should it include publications not shown to be authoritative."
174. In fact, statements given for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, though hearsay, are
specifically permitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EviD. 803(4). A physician's
reliance upon patient statements given for purposes of treatment are generally justified as trustworthy in
forming the basis for an opinion because of the patient's incentive to tell the truth due to a desire to
recover from an illness or injury. Paul D. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV.
473, 495 (1962). Judge Weinstein has stated that when courts allow testimony relying upon patient
statements, "they are based upon a personal history corroborated by* medical records, a physical
examination and medical tests." In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1246
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
175. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988). Professor Imwinkelried suggests a distinction between
the expert's "major premise" - his general scientific principles and theories - and his "minor
premise" - the case-specific information upon which he bases his opinions. For the major premise,
Professor Imwinkelried believes that reliance upon hearsay source material such as the theories and
studies of others "is an absolute necessity," since it would be absurd to require an accident
reconstruction expert to repeat Newton's seventeenth century experiments to derive the laws of motion
or a physicist testifying about the safety of a nuclear power plant to duplicate the works of Fermi or
Oppenheimer. He would give great respect to the expert's choice of a major premise because the
witness' area of expertise consists of mastery of the concepts, methodologies, principles and theories
peculiar to the witness' scientific discipline. Id. at 8-10. With regard to the expert's selection of
information as a minor premise, however, Imwinkelried states that "a radically different picture
emerges. There is no absolute necessity to permit resort to hearsay sources, there is a much less
compelling case for deference to the witness' selection, and by its very nature the information serving
as the minor premise poses peculiar probative dangers at trial." Id. at 10.
176. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Weinstein,
CJ.) (rejecting expert opinions on toxic tort causation based upon hearsay checklists prepared by the
litigants in connection with the litigation in question), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). In Agent
Orange, Judge Weinstein points out that "[n]o case cited by plaintiffs has gone so far as to allow a
doctor to rely on such self-serving laypersons' general affidavits and checklists prepared in gross for a
complex litigation. The influence of glimmering gold at the end of the litigation is particularly evident
in the affidavits signed by plaintiffs' counsel." Id. at 1247. Samples of the affidavits and checklists are
contained at the end of the opinion. See id. at 1264-66.
177. See, e.g., Ventura v. Winegardner, 357 S.E.2d 764, 769 (,V. Va. 1987) (error to permit
vocational expert to base calculations of potential loss of earnings to injured tennis player upon earnings
figures contained in Tennis Week Magazine); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579,
597 (1993) (pointing to the requirement of a trial judge to assess the reliability of the basis for the
expert's opinion).
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The second question relates to the meaning of the phrase "particular field" in that
portion of Federal Rule of Evidence 703 which permits an expert to rely upon
otherwise inadmissible evidence as a basis for his opinion if that evidence is "of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject."'7 It is submitted that the phrase "particular field"
relates to the specific area of scientific endeavor about which the expert is
testifying, not the "field" of a forensic expert. Support for this position is found in
the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 703, which give an example of what a
physician, in his own practice, would rely upon and state, in part, as follows:
If it be feared that enlargement of permissible data [upon which an
expert may rely] may tend to break down the rules of exclusion unduly,
notice should be taken that the rule requires that the facts or data "be
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." The
language would not warrant admitting in evidence the opinion of an
"accidentologist" as to the point of impact in an automobile collision
based on statements of bystanders since this requirement is not satis-
fied. '
One court, in discussing a state equivalent to Rule 703, properly has stated that
in considering the reasonableness of an expert's reliance upon data, it is not enough
to show that the expert relies upon such data "only in preparing for litigation; he
must establish that experts would act upon ... [this data] for purposes other than
testifying in a lawsuit."'" Do experts who design products, then, reasonably rely
upon "other accident" evidence? If this question is meant to refer to detailed,
verified investigations 'of particular accidents in order to understand accident
scenarios and help with product improvement, the answer is "yes.'' If it is meant
to refer to information contained in unverified accident reports submitted by
178. FED. R. EViD. 703.
179. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
180. State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824, 830 (Me. 1978).
181. The Consumer Froduct Safety Commission, for example, has conducted In Depth Investigations
(IDIs) of accidents with particular products under review. It also receives reports, through the National
Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), from data collected in selected hospital emergency rooms
throughout the nation concerning particular accidental injuries. The reports received through NEISS are
rather sketchy accounts, based frequently upon information received from the injured party, who is not
an unbiased witness. When an IDI is conducted, however, there is an attempt to obtain more detailed
information. Sometimes an IDI involves little more than a telephone call. See Oberg v. Honda Motor
Co., 851 P.2d 1084, 1099-1101 (Or. 1993) (Peterson, J., dissenting) (containing discussion and testimony
regarding NEISS and the IDI process); see also Edward J. Heiden, et al., Utility of the U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission's Injury Data System as a Basis for Product Hazard Assessment, 5 J. PROD.
LIAB. 295 (1982) (criticizing the quality of the data generated by NEISS). At other times, an IDI
involves an expert interviewing the injured party, examining the product involved in the accident,
examining the accident scene, and conducting additional investigation. A detailed IDI conducted by a
true expert would be the type of "other accident" evidence upon which, together with other information,




interested parties or persons who did not see the accident, pleadings drafted by
attorneys, or unreliable testimony, the answer is no."
The third question which arises in this area is the following: Assuming that an
expert is permitted to rely upon otherwise inadmissible "other accident" evidence
in the formation of an opinion, can the expert relate information about these other
accidents to the jury? Although there is a substantial dispute as to whether an expert
may relate to the jury a hearsay or otherwise inadmissible basis of the expert's
opinion," the answer clearly should be in the negative. If not, then the situation
would be one where the expert is improperly "used as a conduit for the introduction
of otherwise inadmissible evidence."'"
Without referring specifically to "other accident" evidence, several commentators
have addressed the general issue of an expert relating to the jury evidence which is
not independently admissible but which is found to be reasonably relied upon by the
expert. In a series of thoughtful articles, Professor Carlson argues that while an
expert may be allowed the use of unadmitted hearsay information to form and
propound expert opinions, that information would generally be inappropriate to be
related to the jury.' He states:
[Ain expert whose opinion required extrinsic data may identify and
briefly describe the supporting out-of-court document that gave rise to
his conclusions. To go further and allow the admission of an unauthen-
ticated writing into evidence or to permit the testifying expert to quote
extensively from that writing violates accepted hearsay norms.
Furthermore, in a criminal case, when a prosecutor directs an expert
called by the state to read from an underlying report prepared by
another person, the defendant's constitutional right to confront the
182. See Berger, supra note 164, at 105. Professor Berger has correctly framed the dispute about
an expert's relating hearsay testimony as being "over whether [Federal] Rule 703 [of Evidence] authorizes
experts to testify on direct to the hearsay basis for their conclusions or whether the basis of an expert's
opinion may only be brought out on the cross-examiner's option pursuant to Rule 705." Id. Even if an
expert is not permitted to present to the jury on direct testimony the particular hearsay (or other
inadmissible evidence) upon which the expert is relying, an adversary should be given the right to bring
out this material on cross-examination, if desired. As Professor Carlson has pointed out, such a procedure
is similar to Federal Rule 612, which permits cross-examination as to a writing which a witness uses to
refresh his recollection while testifying - and introduction into evidence by the cross-examiner of those
portions of the writing relating to the testimony - but does not permit the proponent of the witness to
admit the writing into evidence on direct examination. Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert
Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234, 247
(1984) [hereinafter Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony].
183. Department of Corrections v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 107-1, 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (the
court specifically rejected such use; while, in formulating his opinion, a defense expert was permitted
to rely upon an affidavit of another inmate who could not be located at time of trial, the expert could
not read the contents of the affidavit to the jury, since the affidavit was hearsay and inadmissible).
184. See Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony, supra note 182; Ronald L. Carlson,
Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REv. 577 (1986) [hereinafter Carlson,
Modem Expert Testimony]; Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in
Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859 (1992) [hereinafter Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits];
Ronald L. Carlson, In Defense of a Constitutional Theory of Experts, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1182 (1993).
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adverse witness is abridged. That the trial witness relied on the extrinsic
report makes little difference. The outside report remains hearsay and
is not admissible in evidence unless the proponent lays a proper
foundation. Vhile hearsay and confrontation concerns would seem
minimal when an expert simply identifies a background document as a
basis for his opinion, reporting fully to the jury from the conclusions of
nontestifying experts is improper."
Professor Carlson also expresses concern about the unfair prejudice and jury
confusion which can result from permitting the jury to hear the otherwise inadmis-
sible evidence." His quotation of a commentator responding to a proposal to
change the Michigan rule to mirror Federal Rule 703 is particularly relevant as to
the problems which can arise from the introduction, through an expert, of the
substance of otherwise inadmissible evidence:
The hearsay exceptions provide a large gap through which a proponent
of certain evidence may steer the juggernaut of advocacy. Suppose that
certain evidence is utterly inadmissible under any hearsay exception, yet
the proponent needs the evidence in the record. One may merely hire
an expert who will assert that such as he or she reasonably relies on the
data and presto! the inadmissible becomes admissible in Federal
court."s
Professor Imwinkelried agrees with Professor Carlson and, in discussing his
distinction between the expert's major premise and his minor, case-specific
185. Carlson, Modern Expert Testimony, supra note 184, at 584. The reference by Professor Carlson
to permitting the expert to "identify and briefly describe the supporting out-of-court document that gave
rise to his conclusions" could lead to serious problems of unfair prejudice if the reference is interpreted
to permit an expert to relate to the jury words to the effect that "I relied upon the manufacturer's list of
[or answers to interrogatories indicating] twenty other accidents involving hand injuries with this model."
However, it is not believed that the reference is intended so broadly, and Professor Carlson's analysis is
entirely consistent with r,-jecting this type of testimony.
186. Id. at 589. Professor Carlson suggests a revision to Federal Rule 703 to add a new section (b)
incorporating the following concept:
In criminal cases, and generally in civil cases, underlying expert data must be indepen-
dently admissible in order to be received in evidence. An expert's reliance on unadmitted
data does not mandate introduction of the data, where the sole reason for introduction is
that it formed a basis for the expert's opinion. When good cause is shown in civil cases
and the underlying information is particularly trustworthy, the court may admit the data
under this rule to illustrate the basis for the expert's opinion.
Id. at 586. In 1990, Minnesota amended its Evidence Rule 703 to add the following:
(b) Underlying expert data must be independently admissible in order to be received
upon direct exaroanation; provided that when good cause is shown in civil cases and the
underlying data is particularly trustworthy, the court may admit the data under this rule
for the limited purpose of showing the basis for the expert's opinion. Nothing in this rule
restricts admissibility of underlying expert data when inquired into on cross-examination.
MINN. R. EvID. 703; see Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits, supra note 184, at 869.
187. Michael D. WaJe, Counterpoint, ShouldMichigan Rule ofEvidence 703 Be Revised?, 70 MICH.




premise, m he expresses concern about the jury's misuse of otherwise inadmissible
case-specific hearsay information related by an expert."m A different view is taken
by Professor Rice, however.1 ' His feeling is that the value of the expert's
conclusion is dependent upon the underlying premise and that the jury should be
advised of the underlying premise, though it may be hearsay. 9' He concludes as
follows:
With the formal recognition of the expert's right to rely on otherwise
inadmissible evidence ... the practice is altering the players' roles in
litigation. If we are comfortable both with the expert's assumption of
the role of superfactfinder and thirteenth juror and with the diminished
role that necessarily follows for the judge or jury, we openly should
acknowledge and embrace this expanded role. If we are not, we should
give up the severability fiction as a remnant of the past and establish a
hearsay exception for the introduction of the bases of experts' opinions
that sets forth meaningful standards for ensuring reliability.
92
Some of us, however, are not comfortable with an expert's "assumption of the
role of superfactfinder and thirteenth juror" 93 nor with the proposed "diminished
role" for the court," nor are we in favor of creating a hearsay exception which
would permit an expert to act as a conduit for whatever hearsay or otherwise
inadmissible evidence is sought to be placed before the jury. 95 This is particularly
true with regard to the question of an expert relating to the jury information about
the occurrence of other accidents. The stakes are too high, the probative value too
low, and the likelihood of unfair prejudice too great."z
G. Affecting the Credibility of a Defense Expert
A number of cases have dealt with attempts to affect the credibility of defense
experts through the use of other accidents during cross-examination. Some courts
188. See supra note 175.
189. Imwinkelried, supra note 175, at 26.
190. See Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response
to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REv. 583 (1987).
191. lId at 584.
192. Id. at 596.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. One commentator has taken the position that Professor Carlson does not go far enough, and
that there should be a tightening of the bases upon which an expert may rely. David L. Faigman,
Commentary: A Response to Professor Carlson, Struggling to Stop the Flood of Unreliable Expert
Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 877, 889 (1992); see also Schuchman v. Stackable, 555 N.E.2d 1012,
1036-39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (discussing the positions of Professors Carlson, lmwinkelried and Rice).
196. See also In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986). There, the
court referred to the fact that "the professional expert is now commonplace," criticized the "let it all in"
philosophy and the tendency of the trial courts to receive all types of expert testimony with the hope that
the jury will give it "the weight that it deserves," and suggested that the trial judges "take hold of expert
testimony." Id. at 1233-34.
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have permitted such questioning and others have not. In Hale v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co." (Hale 11), for instance, plaintiff was injured by an exploding wheel
rim and the defense expert testified at length to his opinion that the rim was safely
designed and that he had analyzed the design and tested it extensively. Following
this testimony, plaintiffs counsel cross-examined the expert about dissimilar
accidents, some of which were unknown to the expert. Plaintiff argued on appeal
that the evidence of the other accidents was proper to question the qualifications of
the witness, disprove his theories, and impeach his testimony. The court agreed. 9
In doing so, the court stated that "Ithis evidence was proper for impeachment
purposes under the facts of this case where this expert delivered vast and
comprehensive testimony as to the safety of the RH5 rim."'"
In Wheeler v. John Deere Co.,' the defense expert testified that there were no
safety hazards surrounding the vertical auger cleanout door in a combine manufac-
tured by the defendant."' The court held that while evidence of other accidents
is admissible to impeach expert testimony that a product was designed without
safety hazards, the plaintiff must first show that those accidents are "substantially
similar to the accident presently at issue."' Plaintiffs failure in Wheeler to show
substantial similarity as to certain of the other accidents resulted in a reversal.2'
In Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc.,' the trial judge permitted plaintiffs counsel
to cross-examine the defense expert as to other pneumatic nailer accidents about
which there was insufficient proof of similarity. The Eighth Circuit reversed
plaintiffs verdict, pointing out that the defense expert was "testifying as to his
opinions, and any qualified expert must be entitled to do that without having to
rebut extraneous evidence of dissimilar accidents."' The defense expert in Drabik,
had testified that the nailer in question was "not defective... [and was] suitable
and proper ... [and] reasonably safe" and, in response to a leading question from
plaintiffs attorney during cross-examination, had agreed that the nailer was "gener-
ally safe."' Hale II, also an Eighth Circuit opinion, was distinguished and limited
by the court because the expert's testimony in Drabik was found not to rise to the
"vast and comprehensive" level necessary to permit nonsimilar accident evidence
for impeachment purposes, and also because the "other accident" evidence in Hale
II "was a minute portion of the cross-examination," whereas in Drabik, it "formed
the crux of the cross-examination."' As the court in Drabik continued,
197. 820 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1987).
198. Il at 934.
199. Id. at 935. See the criticism of the Hale II decision in Note, supra note 2, at 553-54.
200. 862 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1988).
201. Il at 1409.
202. Il
203. Il; see also Peterson v. Auto Wash Mfg. & Supply Co., 676 F.2d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 1982)
(upholding the refusal to permit cross-examination of a party about a subsequent dissimilar accident to
impeach testimony that "there had never been a problem" with instructions at the car wash in question).
204. 997 F.2d 496 (Sth Cir. 1993). See also discussion supra Part II.C.






To hold that an expert who simply offers his opinion that a product is
"generally safe" opens the door to all other accident evidence would
create an exception which would swallow the general rule. An expert
would not be able to render an opinion without having to address a
litany of other accidents that may or may not be even remotely like the
accident at issue. This simply places too big a burden on defendants.
The general rule of limiting the admission of other accident evidence to
those events which were substantially similar ensures that the focus of
the trial stays on the specific type of accident forming the basis of the
case.
2 ,
Should evidence of other accidents be admissible to affect the credibility of a
defense expert in a product liability case? This depends upon what the expert has
said and the nature of the proof of these other accidents. It also may depend, in
part, upon whether the expert's statements for which the other accidents are claimed
to affect his credibility are made in the course of his direct examination or upon a
leading question in cross-examination designed to open the door to questioning
about other accidents.
If the expert states in direct examination, as he apparently did in Wheeler, that
there were "no safety hazards," and if he persists in this contention, then evidence
of other accidents might be warranted to contradict this testimony. Likewise, if
an expert testifies that an accident cannot possibly occur in a certain way, it would
seem reasonable for properly verified and competent testimony to be presented that
it has, in fact, occurred in that manner. Critical in the presentation of such evidence
to affect the credibility of the expert, however, is that the evidence be verified and
competent and, if it is contested, that the opponent of the "other accident" evidence
have sufficient opportunity for cross-examination and presentation of proof to meet
the contentions and allegations of similarity."' Otherwise, the potential exists that
hearsay, unreliable," and unfairly prejudicial evidence will be presented to the
jury and will affect the outcome of the case.
If, however, the expert expresses the opinion that the product is properly
designed, is reasonably safe, or is not defective, as in Hale II and Drabik, then
"other accident" evidence should not be permitted in the guise of attempting to
208. Id.
209. It is difficult to conceive that the expert in Wheeler would deny, upon questioning, that an
accident could occur, as it apparently did to plaintiff, if a worker placed his arm through the cleanout
door of the defendant's combine and into the auger, and if someone thereafter engaged the auger. It also
would be unusual for an expert to contend that there were no safety hazards with a product, since
virtually any product has potential safety hazards. The exact nature of the questions and of the answers
given by the expert in Wheeler as to the absence of safety hazards is not set forth in the opinion of the
court.
210. Where there is an attempt to impeach a defense expert by the use of evidence of other
accidents, the issue of the propriety of such evidence should be raised initially outside the presence of
the jury, and the court should make a finding of admissibility pursuant to FED. R. EvID. 104(c).
211. See, e.g., the examples of false claims of automobile brake failure and of chain saw rotational
kickback discussed supra in Part II.A.
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affect the credibility of the witness. Indeed, the fact that other accidents may have
occurred - even other similar accidents - does not necessarily contradict this
testimony. In evaluating any claim that evidence of other accidents is necessary to
affect the credibility of a defense expert, the court must consider what has been said
by the expert and whether the other accidents (assuming they can be established by
competent proof to be sufficiently similar) really do contradict the testimony."'
If they do, the court can then weigh the probative value of the other accidents
against the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, or waste of time under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 or the applicable
state rule.'
H. Serving as a Basis of a Claim for Punitive Damages
Where punitive d.amages are permitted in a product liability action,"2 3 "other
accident" evidence has been used to support a claim for punitive damages. In this
area, competent evidence of other accidents, satisfying the necessary foundational
requirements, is proper as one element to be considered by the trier of fact, along
with other necessary evidence.
In general, punitive damages may be awarded for "conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others."214 Dean Pros:3er has used the terms "intentional and deliberate," having the
character of "outrage," and "such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the
212. In Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1993), for instance, the court held
that dissimilar incidents %vere of "no value" in impeaching the testimony of defendant's expert that he
was not aware of other instances in which a particular joint on a Ford vehicle "seized" and caused a loss
of steering control. In JuhLuter v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1973), plaintiffs alleged a
defective design of the steering system of the Ford Bronco which caused the vehicle to "oversteer" at
certain speeds due to the high center of gravity of the vehicle, the lack of independent front suspension,
and a short wheel base. Plaintiffs called a Ford employee as an adverse witness, and asked him if he was
aware of any "legal or writen complaints by users of Broncos about steering problems." Id. at 845. After
he replied that he was not, plaintiffs sought to introduce copies of seven complaints filed against Ford
in various courts throughout the country alleging steering problems with the Bronco. These were
admitted over Ford's objection, and on appeal, plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the complaints
constituted impeachment of the witness. Id. In reversing the decision of the district court, the court of
appeals pointed out that the complaints did not impeach the testimony of the witness that he did not
know of them, and stated that there was no evidence which disputed his testimony in this regard. Id. at
846. Although not discussed by the court in Julander, it further seems clear that it is improper to solicit
introduction of otherwise inadmissible claims or lawsuits merely by asking an adverse witness a question
such as: "Are you aware that there are 15 other claims against your company alleging the same problem
as experienced by the plaintiff?"
213. The great majority of states permit punitive damages in a product liability action. However,
a few do not. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Supp. 1995) (punitive damages outlawed unless
otherwise provided by statute); Distinctive Printing & Packagihg Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb.
1989); Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb. 1975) ("It is a fundamental rule of law in this
state that punitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages are not allowed."); Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank,
635 P.2d 441,444 (Wash. 1981) (with narrow exceptions made by the legislature, "punitive damages are
contrary to public policy"), modified, 649 P.2d 827 (Wash. 1982).




interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton."" 5 Various
state statutes dealing with punitive damages use similar terms. 1 6 The existence of
other accidents, though, is neither sufficient to prove a defect,"7 nor does it
provide the circumstances of "outrage" necessary for the award of punitive damag-
es.2t 8 Where such evidence can be useful in the area of punitive damages is on the
issue of notice or knowledge. In the punitive damages setting, however, "notice"
and "knowledge" mean much more than knowledge that other accidents have
occurred or that there are certain hazards connected with use of the product."9
Professors Ghiardi and Kircher make clear that the type of notice or knowledge
required in a product liability punitive damages claim is knowledge both of a defect
and of the danger of substantial harm from the defect. As they state, "[a] defendant
who is unaware of a product's defect can hardly 'consciously' or 'recklessly'
215. KEETON, supra note 92, § 2, at 9-10.
216. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Weft Supp. 1996) ("oppression, fraud or malice";
"oppression" is defined as "despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person's rights"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987) ("fraud, malice, or
willful and wanton conduct"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (Vest 1991) ("reckless disregard for
the safety of product users, consumers or others who were injured by the product"); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1(b) (1990) ("willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want
of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences"); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1987) ("willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of another"); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §60-3701(c) (West 1994) ("willful conduct, wanton conduct, fraud or malice"); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1996) ("deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others"); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-221 (1993) ("actual fraud or actual malice"); NEv. REv. STAT. § 42.005 (1991) ("oppres-
sion, fraud or malice, express or implied"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12 (West Supp. 1996) ("actual
malice" or an act or omission "accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who
foreseeably might be harmed by those acts or omissions"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A)
(Anderson 1995) ("misconduct ... that manifested a flagrant disregard of the safety of persons who
might be harmed by the product in question"); 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1 (Supp. 1996) (three graduated
categories for punitive damages: clear and convincing evidence of "reckless disregard for the rights of
others"; clear and convincing evidence of an act done "intentionally and with malice towards others";
and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of an act done "intentionally and with malice towards others"
where the defendant "engaged in conduct life-threatening to humans"); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537 (Supp.
1996) ("malice" or "a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm" and
action "with a conscious indifference to the health, safety and welfare of others"); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
§ 21-3-2 (Michie 1987) ("oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-
1 (1992) ("willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing
and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others").
217. See supra Part III.A.
218. Very substantial additional evidence should be required for this purpose. See, e.g., infra note
219.
219. For an example of the type of additional evidence which has been presented to show
knowledge in a punitive damages context, see Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct.
App. 1981). Grimshaw arose from the rupture of a Ford Pinto fuel tank in a rear end collision, resulting
in fatal bums to the driver and severe bum injuries to the passenger. Evidence was presented that Ford
proceeded with production of the Pinto with knowledge that the fuel tank was improperly located and
insufficiently protected, and after rejecting recommendations from its engineers that the condition be
corrected. The court referred to managements knowledge that the condition could be corrected for a cost
of $4 to $8 per car and to an inference that the defendant "decided to defer corrective measures to save
money and enhance profits." Id. at 361-62, 369.
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disregard any other party's rights."' They further point out that "in every award
of punitive damages [in a product liability action], the defendant manufacturer was
aware of the existing defect and was aware of the serious danger of substantial harm
posed by such defect."' In Lewy v. Remington Arms Co.,' the court declared
that "notice is important in establishing a submissible case for punitive damag-
es.."tm And in Soden v. Freightliner Corp.,m where evidence of other accidents
was admitted on the issue of knowledge, the court made clear that "Freightliner's
knowledge of the defective design of its fuel system.., was a required element in
the... claim for exemplary damages."'
There is little doubt that evidence of other accidents, particularly those involving
serious injuries, can have a powerful - and sometimes unfair - impact upon the
jury and be instrumental in the award of punitive damages.' Accordingly, great
care must be taken in its admission for that purpose. The court in Soden permitted
evidence of complaints to the defendant of other postcollision fuel fires, but gave
strong limiting instructions to the jury. These instructions included stating to the
jury that the other complaints were not being offered to prove the truth of the
matters therein but only to show notice of allegations or claims of defective design;
that the notice constituted "unsworn hearsay allegations of persons seeking to
recover money damages from the defendant"; and that "[t]he complaints are not
proof of the matters alleged."' The limiting instructions undoubtedly were
helpful, but while the jury in Soden did not award punitive damages, it did award
$885,300 in compensatory damages. The extent to which the compensatory award
may have been increased - or even caused - by the admission of the "other
accident" evidence is unknown.
Finally, when the sole purpose for the admission of evidence of other accidents
is to show notice or knowledge for purposes of a punitive damages claim, it is
suggested that the issue of punitive damages be bifurcated.m In this way, the
220. JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNMVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.21
(Supp. 1991).
221. ld.
222. 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988).
223. Id. at 1108.
224. 714 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1983).
225. Id. at 508; see also Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1980).
226. See, for exampla, the awards in General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1994) and Drabilk v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 997 F.2d 496 (8th Cir. 1993), which were overturned
due to the improper adrn,.sion of "other accident" evidence. See also supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
227. Soden, 714 F.2d at 507 n.12. The court also indicated that "the weaknesses otherwise inherent
in allegations as a basis for notice were mitigated by several factors," including that the defendant did
not contest either the occurTence of the other accidents or that they involved post-crash fuel fires, did not
seek to dispute similarity, and did not raise at trial a claim that the evidence was unduly prejudicial under
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 508-09.
228. For an itenizaticn of egislative activity concerning bifurcation of punitive damages, see BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1619-20 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Even in the
absence of statutory authority, courts generally have the power to bifurcate claims "to avoid prejudice"




likelihood of unfair prejudice which may affect the jury's decision in the underlying
claim can be avoided.
IV. Conclusion
While the admission of "other accident" evidence in product liability litigation can
be critical to the outcome of a case, the proper role of such evidence is in much
dispute.' This article has attempted to explore the foundational bases for the
admission of this evidence, to consider the merits of the principal arguments raised
for admission, and to analyze why, and under what circumstances, admission is
warranted.
From a review of the decisions, it is apparent that a considerable number of
courts have ignored important issues necessary to reach a proper determination of
the question of admissibility. The failure to consider these issues often has led to
unjust results. With an appropriate foundation, "other accident" evidence does have
a legitimate place in product liability litigation. This place, however, is considerably
narrower and accompanied by more restrictions than many courts have found.
punitive damages claims is desirable for a number of reasons, including not just the avoiding of
prejudice, but also avoiding the necessity to produce potentially lengthy testimony and exhibits which
will be unneeded (in those states which require a compensatory damages verdict in order to permit
punitive damages to be awarded) unless the plaintiff is able to recover compensatory damages.
229. Professors Wright and Graham have concluded that "[tihe cases are in a state of hopeless
disorder" and have correctly written that "often the appellate courts fail to take into account the
distinctions necessary for a proper evaluation of the relevance of evidence of other incidents through a
failure to carefully consider the purposes for which the evidence is offered." 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACrCE AND PROCEDURE § 5170 (1978).
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